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ABSTRACT
Old-fashioned, biological, or ―Jim Crow‖ racism is viewed by many in the political
science and psychology literature to be largely a relic of the past. In the post-segregation era it
has been replaced as a political force by symbolic racism, although its residual effect still
operates within symbolic racism as negative racial affect. Symbolic racism is thought of as a
coherent belief system that describes whites‘ attitudes not only in the United States, but in some
European democracies as well. This conceptualization of symbolic racism ignores the
differences in the historical legacy of racism across different regional and demographic contexts.
Different contexts have produced different legacies of racism. This is especially true in the
United States, where different regions have varying histories in terms of the intensity of the laws
enforcing segregation. In states that had slaves and anti-miscegenation laws until forced to
repeal them, old-fashioned racism is more likely operate under a cover of symbolic racism rather
than reflect the way symbolic racism operates in the rest of the United States. To test this theory,
the factor loadings of different old-fashioned racism and symbolic racism items will be analyzed
across regions, gender, and gender within regions using data from the General Social Survey
from 1994-2008. Generally in the symbolic racism literature, the South and gender are added as
dummy variables in regression analyses of whites‘ racial attitudes. In addition to this typical
strategy for analyzing the aggregate sample, separate regressions will be performed on the
regions and sexes to see if there is any substantial difference. The separate effects of oldfashioned and symbolic racism on whites‘ attitudes regarding racial policy issues will also be
analyzed across the enumerated dimensions. Symbolic racism does appear to be associated with
old-fashion racism for many in the U.S., especially in the South. It may also have slightly
different origins and influences on men and women. Possible strategies for determining these
differences include focus groups, in-depth interviews, and the use of racial codes and cues
signaling a higher threshold of the social acceptability of racist beliefs.

vi

INTRODUCTION
“I’m not a racist, but…”
A man named Don Lewis has a dream. He plans on launching an all-white basketball
league, the All-American Basketball Alliance, featuring only Caucasian, American-born players
(Byler 2010). Lewis‘s justification for the league involves rhetoric about how blacks are
inherently better at basketball and that they have also ruined the ―fundamental,‖ ―traditional‖
aspects of the game. This whites-only league seems to be a clear reflection of a belief that blacks
and whites should not mix because of fundamental racial differences, the ideological core of oldfashioned racism. When confronted about the racism inherent to the concept of a whites-only
league in an interview with comedian Jason Jones of The Daily Show with Jon Stewart, Lewis
claimed, ―People can make anything seem racist‖ (3/29/10). This was played for huge laughs on
the show, but it hints at a phenomenon that has serious implications for the study of racial
attitudes using survey data. When being labeled as racist is considered socially undesirable, even
blatant displays of racism are framed by individuals as reflecting some other value which is more
fundamentally important to them than race. In the case of the whites-only basketball league,
Lewis describes the effort as part of a return to ―fundamentals‖ and ―traditional, white
basketball‖ rather than reflecting any personal racist feelings.
In a similar seemingly obvious display of old-fashioned racism, a justice of the peace in
Hammond, Louisiana, caused a controversy when he refused to marry an interracial couple in
2009. He admitted that in the two and one half years preceding the media attention, he had asked
everyone who called to request a marriage license if they were part of a mixed-race couple. If
the individual answered in the affirmative, he told the individual to find someone else to legalize
the marriage. Despite what seemed to be a transparent display of unqualified racism, he claimed
steadfastly that he was not a racist and that his actions did not reflect any underlying racial
animus. Instead, he framed his opposition to interracial marriage in terms of sensitivity to the
difficulties that hypothetical children conceived in such a union might face. He is not a racist;
rather he is concerned about the quality of life of the children of interracial couples (Foster
2009).
Two individuals behaving foolishly and ignorantly do not provide sufficient evidence to
draw conclusions about an endemic program of beliefs concerning racial minorities among the
white majority. Other recent examples from the South, though, can provide examples of the
legacy of formal segregation and old-fashioned racist beliefs in the region. As recently as 2009,
high schools in some Southern states were still organizing segregated, ―whites only‖ proms
(Corbett 2009). In response to this tradition, actor Morgan Freeman financed an integrated prom
for a school in Mississippi; despite Freeman‘s encouragement and star power, some white
students and parents insisted upon holding their own segregated dance. Two individuals such as
the justice of the peace and Don Lewis may only be isolated examples of clinging on to their
antiquated ways, but when entire schools—including the schools‘ administrations, the county
school boards providing district oversight, and the communities in which the schools are
located—are complicit in such activities concerned with the maintenance of the vestiges of
formal segregation it shows a more active role of old-fashioned racism than the symbolic racism
theory would anticipate. After the Congress passed healthcare reform, scores of protestors yelled
1

racial slurs at Democratic lawmakers (Herszenhorn and Pear 2010). Many commentators have
noted the racial tinge of some of the ―Tea Party‖ activists‘ rhetoric.1 Why are traditional
practices of racism such as these anecdotal examples thought to be of little concern to the
modern political context despite the fact that although there has been progress in terms of the
liberalization of whites‘ racial attitudes, there is strong theoretical support for the notion that this
progress has almost certainly been overstated? To stretch an old metaphor, we have given the
foxes the run of the henhouse in terms of the reliance on self-reported attitudes about race in
discussions of racism.
Although whites may support the principles of equality, they do not seem to be willing to
implement many substantive policies aimed at making those principles reality. Symbolic racism
may be the concept that explains most of this opposition. But is there enough evidence to
support symbolic racism as the monolithic explanation for whites‘ opinions on racial issues?
The dynamics of symbolic racism have rarely been described in terms of what, if any, variation
exists among whites in their conformity to the measure. Has symbolic racism replaced oldfashioned racism everywhere, including in the regions with a strong legacy of racist practices
and ideology? Does it work in the same way for men and for women? It seems abundantly clear
to me as someone who has grown up in what may be America‘s last bastion of blatant racist
attitudes and practices—the Deep South—that symbolic racism is only telling part of the story.
Like any worthwhile literature, the literature on symbolic racism offers as many further questions
and puzzles as it does answers. These questions will be further specified and discussed below.
First, an explanation for the use of race as a concept is in order. In order to provide such
an explanation, analysis will be employed from a comparative perspective to highlight the social
and cultural foundations of race as a useful concept, not just in the political and social sciences,
but more generally. Second, the theories of ‗modern racism,‘ which I will lump for the most part
under the title of symbolic racism, will be further elaborated and discussed; the discussion will
include the theoretical and empirical evidence supporting the practice of distinguishing between
―racial stereotypes,‖ ―racial affect,‖ and ―old-fashioned racism.‖ Third, I will describe several
hypotheses that arise from this discussion of symbolic racism and provide an explanation for
how to test the hypotheses using data available on the General Social Survey from 1994-2008.
Fourth, the results of the specified tests will be analyzed and interpreted. Next, whites‘ votes for
Obama in Southern states, rates of interracial marriage, and levels of symbolic and old-fashioned
racism will be compared to provide context for the conclusion. Finally, the conclusion will
provide a final discussion of the implications of different conceptions of how racism influences
politics, as well as suggestions for future research.

1

For an illustrative example, The Huffington Post has compiled photographs of anti-Obama protest signs
at http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2009/04/16/10-most-offensive-tea-par_n_187554.html (4/1/10).
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LITERATURE REVIEW
In light of the social undesirability of being labeled as racist, even for a man such as Don
Lewis, who believes there is still a market in 2010 to support an all-white basketball league, it is
amazing that researchers have been satisfied with survey measures of what is often called ―oldfashioned‖ or ―traditional‖ racism. The expression of old-fashioned racism is difficult to
measure because those who hold these racist feelings or beliefs are also likely to realize the
stigma associated with being labeled as racist and thus avoid answering in ways that could be
perceived as such. Voiced opinions on racial issues that can be cloaked under the blanket of
principled ideological opposition become entangled with the more amorphous, impersonally
directed attitudes and opinions based on a mainstream conception of symbolic racism.
Discerning those who are using symbolic racism as a vessel to disguise traditional racist feelings
from those for whom symbolic racism is operating as it does in theory is problematic for several
reasons.
Measures of ―new‖ or ―modern‖ racism are well developed and tested (Sears and Kinder
1971; Sears and McConahay 1973; McConahay 1986; Henry and Sears 2002; Tarman and Sears
2005), but responses to survey questions concerning ―old-fashioned‖ racism have not received as
much attention. This lack of attention to old-fashioned racism persists in spite of the fact that
symbolic racism is theorized to be a blend of traditional racism, negative affect, and
individualistic conservative political ideology (Sears and Henry, 2003). The connection between
old-fashioned racism and symbolic racism has largely been downplayed through a strategy of
differentiating ―racial affect‖ and ―stereotypes‖ as separate from old-fashioned racism, when it
could just as easily be argued that racial affect and stereotypes are precisely what justified and
enforced the system of traditional racism from which symbolic racism is supposed to be distinct.
Furthermore, the idea that symbolic racism reflects a uniformity of racist feelings throughout the
United States or other Western democracies is difficult to accept based on solely on evidence
from surveys, given the propensity of respondents to make survey responses conform to their
understanding of the socially desirable answer.
Despite progress in the destruction of formal barriers to racial equality across Western
democracies, there remain great disparities in the successes of minority racial and ethnic groups
compared to other groups within their countries. These disparities are generally attributed to the
group‘s status as a minority, but the lack of white support for many racially egalitarian policies is
attributed to diverse causes from the historical, sociopyschological, social structural, and to
conceptions of disparity based on ―race-neutral‖ ideology and ―normal politics.‖ Much of the
disagreement pertains to why minority groups (in the discussion of the United States, minority
will primarily refer to Americans of African or Caribbean descent and who heretofore will be
referred to as blacks or black people for concision) are in a disadvantaged position compared to
the white members of a particular society. By starting from a comparative perspective on how
race is conceptualized and discussing the political effects of the various conceptualizations, a
greater understanding of race politics in the United States can be attained. Examples from Brazil
and South Africa will provide an interesting relief from this minority-majority opposition. In
these countries, white populations are nearly equal or outnumbered by the black and colored
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populations, yet the black or colored groups are still disadvantaged compared to their white
countrymen.

Comparative Scientific Perspectives on Uses of Race
Different countries have variously constructed the determinants of what makes a person
of a certain race. In the United States, Britain, and Israel, the construction of race in scientific
and medical research has reflected the socio-cultural construction of the concept inherited in
those countries but has also continuously evolved over that time. In the years following World
War II, scientists generally recognized that race was more of a cultural and social construction
than a definite biological category that could be systematically applied to delineate one group
from another (Gissis 2008, 438).
However, the scientific community in the United States in particular was unable to escape
the category of race; further, Gissis asserts that ―adopting the category of ‗race‘ implied adopting
the value systems and epistemological commitments within whose frameworks it had functioned
as meaningful‖ (2008, 448). In his survey of scientific research in major journals of genetics,
medicine, and epidemiology published between 1947 and 2003, Gissis found that scientists in the
United States have used race as an explanatory variable since the 1960s, whereas in Britain and
in Israel2 this trend has been avoided in favor of more discussion of environmental factors,
country of origin, class, and, in Israel, religion (2008, 445). So, although race is not a real,
scientifically discernable genetic or medical phenomenon, and despite the fact that since the
early 1970s scientists have agreed that ―there is greater diversity within groups than among
groups,‖ race has been used by geneticists, doctors, and epidemiologists in the United States as a
causal, substantive variable rather than an analytic one (Gissis 2008, 447). Since the early
1980s, the use of race in these ‗essentialised‘ ways has expanded, rather than declined, in these
fields.
Constructions of Race
In the United States, an all-or-nothing approach to race has generally followed a strict
rule: either you are all white or not white at all. This is a standard that few people, in practice, are
able to meet. Additionally, whiteness is associated with ―Americaness‖ (Harris-Lacewell 2003,
230). This ―one-drop‖ construction of blackness differs from the approach of other countries
such as Brazil3 and South Africa, where there is a stratification of classifications between black,
colored or mulatto, and white, with darker skin corresponding to a lower placement in the social,
political, and economic order (Marx 1996, 187-188). Yet another approach is found in France,
where talk of racial differences and racial classification in general is frowned upon as inherently
―I would suggest that the avoidance of the term ‗race‘ for more than sixty years does not mean that the
units of classification called ‗ethnic communities‘ or ‗ethnic groups‘ (in Hebrew edot) and so on were not
conceptualised and used in an analogous manner to that of ‗race‘ as it functioned in numerous Americanauthored articles. Rather, it indicates the existence of a powerful, cultural-emotional barrier concerning
the use of ‗race‘ in post-war Israeli society‖ (Gissis 2008, 446).
3
Despite these informally recognized stratifications in Brazil, even the study of discrimination was made
off limits in an attempt to reflect a racially unified society. ―The concept of race was effectively banned
as an enemy of nation security‖ (Marx 1998, 172).
2
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racist. There, the term ―ethnicity‖ is used; ―Frenchness‖ is associated with acceptance of French
social and cultural norms and is not constructed with regard to differences of physical
appearance (Hargreaves 2007, 33). This does not mean that French discrimination against ethnic
minorities and immigrant populations is not as ‗racist‘ in effect, but rather that discrimination has
a different origin in France than in the United States.4
Markus attempts to provide a definition of race and ethnicity in the context of the social
sciences. She defines race as:
a dynamic set of historically derived and institutionalized ideas and practices that
(1) sorts people into ethnic groups according to perceived physical and behavioral
human characteristics; (2) associates differential value, power, and privilege with
these characteristics and establishes a social status ranking among the different
groups; and (3) emerges (a) when groups are perceived to pose a threat (political,
economic, or cultural) to each other‘s world view or way of life; and/or (b) to
justify the denigration and exploitation (past, current, or future) of, and prejudice
toward, other groups (2008, 654).
This definition is generally compatible with the way race is used in the various studies of the
ramifications of race politics in the countries that will be surveyed here. Markus further
distinguishes ethnicity from race in a way that is relevant to the discussion of Western European
race politics, which are more ‗ethnicised‘ than ‗racialized‘ (Hargreaves 2007, Gissis 2008).
Ethnicity, then, is defined as:
a dynamic set of historically derived and institutionalized ideas and practices that
(1) allows people to identify or to be identified with groupings of people on the
basis of presumed (and usually claimed) commonalities including language,
history, nation or region of origin, customs, ways of being, religion, names,
physical appearance, and/or genealogy or ancestry; (2) can be a source of
meaning, action, and identity; and (3) confers a sense of belonging, pride, and
motivation (Markus 2008, 654).
For Markus, the term ―race‖ has a negative connotation, whereas ―ethnicity‖ is generally
positive. Race is about exclusion, whereas ethnicity is about meaning and identity. Despite its
more positive connotation, ethnicity has still been used as a justification for exclusionary
practices in Europe. Gissis points to the stronger influence of the events of World War II in
Europe and the history of institutionalized racism in the United States as some of the possible
reasons for this differentiation in the use of terminology and conceptualization between the two
regions.

Hargreaves also contends that there is a more ―ethnocultural‖ definition of ―Germanness‖ in Germany,
which while perhaps racist in application, originates from a similar construction of national identity to
France (2007, 34).
4
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Anthony Marx has argued that the nation state is the prime mover in ―race-making.‖ In
both the United States and South Africa, the state sought to unify whites around the oppression
of blacks in order to solve some the intra-white tensions in the countries that were the main lines
of cleavage following the Civil War and Boer War, respectively. The development of the
economy depended on domestic peace, so while states made race, race also made the state. In
South Africa a strong, central state was formed to protect and unify whites against the black
majority. In the United States, a weak and decentralized central state preserved the polity by
diffusing white concerns throughout the federalized states (Marx 1998, 268). Southern states
were free to follow their discriminatory practices, which preserved the union in the midst of
intra-white tensions created during the Civil War and Reconstruction. (1998, 198). These nation
states‘ efforts for white unity also had the unintended effect of black unity (1998, 206).

Racial Gaps in Conditions:
United States
In the United States, Brazil, and France, there are ‗racial gaps‘ between the conditions of
whites and blacks that remain despite progress on many fronts. Between 1940 and 1994, the life
expectancy discrepancy between black and white men in the United States barely changed,
dropping from ten to nine years. For women, there was a moderate change from thirteen to six
years (Farley 1996, 225). In 2005, black-white marriages accounted for only 5.5% of marriages
in the United States (Rosenfeld 2007). Blacks remain the most residentially segregated group in
the United States. Although blacks make up eleven percent of the population, less than two
percent of America‘s elected officials are black (Sears et al. 2000). The trends in these gaps are
sources of controversy; some are optimistic about continued narrowing of the gaps (Thernstrom
and Thernstrom 1997), while others perceive a stagnation of progress in recent years and are
more pessimistic about the prospects for progress (Hacker 1992; Bell 1992).
France
In France, non-European immigrants generally face higher levels of unemployment and
were out of work longer than both French nationals and European immigrants (Hargreaves 2007,
54). Non-European and especially African immigrants were less likely to be homeowners and
more likely to live in public housing (2007, 63-64). In the late 1980s, African immigrant
households earned less than one-third per capita income than the average French national (2007,
71). Still, compared to the high level of segregation in the United States, France is a relatively
integrated nation. According to Hargreaves, the ―spatial distribution of minorities in France is
such that ‗mono-ethnic‘ neighborhoods are very rare and never extensive‖ (2007, 138).
Brazil
Brazil differs from both France and the United States in that it has been categorized as a
‗developing‘ rather than ‗developed‘ (read: Western) democracy. It does have some key
similarities to the United States, including a large population of blacks with African heritage who
were deposited in the country through the extensive slave trade, which lasted until the 19th
century. In Brazil in 1960, the average income of blacks was Cr $5,440; for ―mulattoes‖ it was
6

Cr $6,492; and for whites Cr $11,601. In 1976, white and non-white income ratios remained
roughly the same, with whites still out-earning non-whites by almost double (Marx 1996, 191).
There is general agreement in the literature that in many countries with various historical
backgrounds, constitutions, and conceptions of race, blacks remain in a lower economic and social
position than whites. So, although race and ethnicity may vary in their constructions, the

consequences of belonging to certain races or ethnicities can be felt across different cultural,
social, historical, and institutional contexts.

The Space between Principle and Action
The gap in conditions in the United States is all the more puzzling considering that for
more than the past half century, white Americans have expressed increasingly ‗liberal‘ responses
supporting egalitarian principles, but this has not been followed by an increase in support for
‗liberal‘ racial policies with equality as their goal (Schuman et al. 1997). France, in contrast, has
experienced the ‗ethnicisation‘ of politics since the mid-1980s with the rise of the far right Front
National party and their anti-immigrant platform (Hargreaves 2007, 172). In the past in Brazil,
race as an issue has traditionally been eschewed and a doctrine of ―racial democracy‖ has been
preached. This is, in brief, the idea that racial unity has already been achieved in Brazil, so no
further discussion of race is necessary or helpful. The Brazilian government has historically set
up no formal racial distinctions or barriers but also, as a result of the doctrine of racial
democracy, provided no programs targeted to help disadvantaged Afro-Brazilians. In practice
this doctrine led to the disparities discussed above. The lack of formal racial barriers and
distinctions, coupled with the idea of racial democracy, allowed informal racist practices to occur
by producing a façade of equality that could not be formally challenged by Afro-Brazilians
(Marx 1998, 168).
Kevin Durrheim, writing in the context of a discussion of support for affirmative action
in South Africa, nicely describes this common situation where many ―whites attempt to bolster
their self-presentation as tolerant non-racist people while at the same time opposing programmes
that are designed to help blacks.‖ In effect, ―they articulate support for change whilst
concurrently struggling against it‖ (Durrheim 2007, 114). The theoretical reasons for this lack of
white support for policy when there is no lack of support for the principle are the source of most
of the contention in the literature on racial attitudes. Where does this opposition among whites
come from? Despite the varying constructions of ‗race‘ or ‗ethnicity‘ framing the conversations
in the countries discussed above, discrimination against blacks persists in each. The task then
becomes is to explore the theoretical linkages between racial attitudes and policy preferences.
Linking Racial Attitudes to Policy Preferences
The main controversy in the literature on racial attitudes and policy concerns the source
of white ambivalence to policies promoting racial equality. Is it simply old-fashioned biological
racism that assumes white racial superiority or some new kind of modern racism based on
subconsciously socialized aversion or negative affect? Is opposition to programs promoting
racial equality simply a reflection of a conservative ideology of individualism and a preference
for low levels of government intervention? Is it based on an unarticulated white desire to
7

maintain group dominance? All of these questions represent different schools of thought on
racial attitudes and policy preferences. A helpful way of categorizing these theories has been as
the sociopsychological, social structure, and political approaches (Sears et al. 2000; HarrisLacewell 2003).
Sociopsychological Theories and Symbolic Racism
Sociopsychological theories begin with an assumption that prejudice and other social
values are socialized during early life. Many of the theories also start with the assumption that
the issue of formal racial equality is settled and yet racism remains. Perhaps the most influential
of these sociopsychological theories is the ―symbolic racism‖ approach pioneered by Sears and
Kinder (1971). Symbolic racism is usually described as a coherent belief system combining four
distinct but closely related ―themes‖: that racial discrimination is no longer a serious obstacle to
blacks' prospects for a good life; that blacks' continuing disadvantages are due to their own
unwillingness to take responsibility for their lives; that blacks, rather than being disadvantaged,
actually receive undeserved benefits; and that, as a result, blacks' continuing anger about their
treatment, their demands for better treatment, and the various kinds of special government
attention given to them are not justified and are therefore considered excessive (Henry and Sears
2002, 254).
Symbolic racism theory also holds that old-fashioned, traditional racism no longer
predicts with accuracy racial policy attitudes or voting behavior. Despite the lack of this
traditional racism, there is still a socialization of ―negative affect‖ and stereotypes about blacks,
―leaving a reservoir of racial antipathy decoupled from racialist beliefs‖ (Sears et al. 2000, 17).
Blacks are also believed by whites to violate traditional American values such as the Protestant
work ethic and self-reliance, held especially dear by those with a conservative ideology.
Additionally, symbolic racism is tied to a belief that discrimination is no longer a barrier to
blacks. Related to this belief is a resentment that develops from continuing programs targeted at
equality between blacks and whites which are seen by symbolic racists as giving blacks an
undeserved advantage over whites (Sears et al. 2000, 77). The measurement of symbolic racism
has been well developed (McConahay 1986; Henry and Sears 2002). The Symbolic Racism
2000 (SR2K) scale developed by Sears and his colleagues has transposed the themes of symbolic
racism onto consistently asked survey items (see Appendix A).
The symbolic racism theory has been criticized from many fronts: that symbolic racism
simply measures conservatism, that some of the frequently used measures can be interpreted as
indexing racial threat, and that symbolic racism is in fact indistinguishable from old-fashioned
racism. Another important criticism is that the theoretical link between individualistic values is
often not found, or when it is found, it is often weaker than expected (for example, Sears et al.
1997). If individualistic values are not coupled with the negative affect about blacks, then the
theory is not much more than a gussied-up version of traditional racism. In trying to address this
problem, Sears and his colleagues find that individualistic values only register significantly when
they are presented with a racial tinge, and that inegalitarian values generally are better predictors
of illiberal racial policy preferences (2000, 107). It seems suspicious that outside of the context
of race, individual values become less important.
8

Pettigrew and Meertens developed another variation on this type of theory in order to
address concerns that symbolic racism was too specific to the United States. They instead
suggest that there is ―subtle‖ and ―blatant‖ racism at work in both Europe and the United States
(1995). Subtle racism is conceptually very similar to symbolic racism and is tied to the defense
of traditional values, the exaggeration of cultural differences, and the lack of positive feelings
and empathy for the out-group. As Hargreaves has pointed out, ―race relations‖ are generally not
talked about in Continental Europe. Instead, discussions of ―immigration‖ and ―integration‖ take
place in the same political space as ―race relations‖ do in the United Kingdom and United States,
despite the fact that the discourse is different (Hargreaves 2007, 36). Pettigrew and Meertens
find evidence that in Europe there are three kinds of racial attitudes: subtle prejudice, blatant
prejudice, and equalitarianism (Pettigrew and Meertens 1995). For example, they find that
bigots or blatant racists are the most likely group to support restricted rights for immigrants and
the least likely to support extended rights. Subtle racists are found to be most likely to support
the status quo.
Social Structural Theories
Social structural theories tend to emphasize social structure and group interests. In
general, the theories postulate that individuals identify most closely with their own ethnic or
racial group. These groups have competing interests—real or perceived—which generate
conflict. Additionally, dominant groups develop ideologies to ―justify and legitimize their
hegemony‖ (Sears et al. 2000, 22). One such social structural theory was pioneered by Donald
Campbell and has taken the name ―realistic group conflict‖ (Levine and Campbell, 1971).
According to this theory, opposition to policies promoting equality result from the threat posed
by the disadvantaged group to the dominant group‘s privileges. Vanneman and Pettigrew have
found that only a slight perception of this antagonism is enough to make the dominant group feel
threatened of deprivation (1972).
The sense of group position—that is, a group‘s ―beliefs about the proper relation between
groups‖—attributes a great deal of weight to social status, in contrast to realistic group conflict‘s
emphasis on political or economic interests (Bobo et al. 1997, 38). Group position also
elaborates on the assumptions of group conflict theory: in-group members view their group as
superior, view out-group members as different and alien, and feel that their membership in the
group legitimates special access to the privileges of status and power. The racism that develops
from this view of intergroup relations is called ―laissez-faire racism‖ by Bobo and involves
continued stereotyping of blacks while placing the responsibility for the racial gap in conditions
on blacks themselves (Sears et al. 2000, 25). This form of racism is not a new, modern racism
like the symbolic form but rather has grown naturally out of the same defense of group interests
in which dominant groups historically have engaged.
Political Theories
―Political‖ theories are based on an understanding that white attitudes towards racial
policies focus on the effect of the ideological tension that exists, in the United States especially,
between the ―race neutral‖ values of egalitarianism, individualism, and limited government.
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Many whites‘ opposition to racially liberal policies is based on their perception of the policies as
violating one of these principles in some way, or that they simply value individualism and
limited government more strongly than egalitarianism. Additionally, political debates are
presented to the public by elites who make use of this ideological language. This argument is
generally attributed to Sniderman and Carmines (1989). These differences in principles or
ideology have no room for race, and the role of racism is relegated to a very small place in most
of these political theories (Sears et al. 2000, 29). Often whites‘ opposition to racially liberal
policies is formulated as based somewhat counterintuitively on a commitment to egalitarianism
and the perception that special treatment violates this norm.
Of course, underlying this argument is the concept that these ideological values are raceneutral. However, there are instances, especially in black scholarship on ideology, where
scholars reject the idea that conservative values such as individualism and the Protestant work
ethic are race-neutral. Rogers Smith argues that individualism, meritocracy, and the concept of
the work ethic are fundamentally elements of the maintenance of white domination (1997).
Indeed, Sears et al. note that some research in the political theories school finds a strong
correlation between ideological conservatism and racist attitudes (2000, 31). Smith adds that
conservatism and racism have become inextricably intertwined since the civil rights movement.
Further, the idea that opposition to special treatment for disadvantaged groups is based on
commitment to egalitarian principles finds little evidence: those who support egalitarianism are
the ones most likely to support liberal racial policies (Sears et al. 2000, 112; Pettigrew and
Meertens 1995).
Additionally, both political theories and those resembling symbolic racism face a further
criticism: in all of these discussions, the phrase ―American values‖ could easily be replaced with
―white values.‖ The values of white Americans only are labeled American and the values of
other groups of Americans are often ignored or ridiculed. On top of this, as noted above, these
race-laden values are consistently called ―race neutral‖ (Harris-Lacewell 2003, 232).

Lumping “Modern” Racisms Together
Of these differing approaches to explaining whites‘ racial attitudes, the symbolic racism
approach is perhaps the most representative of the new or modern racisms. It incorporates
elements of other explanations such as negative affect, conservatism, and defense of traditional
position and values into what has been touted as a coherent and consistent concept that underpins
white racial attitudes, not just across regions and groups within the United States, but across the
different contexts of race and ethnicity in other countries.
Jennifer Hochschild has pointed out that many of the disagreements in this argument
about what motivates white opinion are based on differences of style rather than substance.5 I
believe that she is largely correct about this. In fact, symbolic racism has been reworked and
developed over time to reflect the criticisms and concerns of other theories, and in the process, it
has taken on some of the tenets of the once-opposing critical theories. In this sense, symbolic
racism is a sort of monolithic system. But it has failed to address some of the basic concerns of
She argues that some scholars are ―splitters‖ who tend to portray concepts as opposed and some are
―lumpers‖ who look for areas of common ground between the schools (Hochschild 2000, 325).
5
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its critics, especially in its handling of the distinction between symbolic and old-fashioned racism
(Sniderman and Tetlock 1986; Virtanen and Huddy 1998). Additionally, symbolic racism has
remained somewhat ambivalent about the theoretical role of conservatism within the system.
―Pulling yourself up by your own bootstraps‖ may be thought of as an American value or, more
generally, a tenet of many ideologically rightwing parties across the globe, but this perspective
completely ignores the historical context of just whose value it has been and the practical results
that are demonstrated by its application in the area of racial politics. That the empirical affects of
individualism and conservatism can only be determined when they are ―racially tinged‖ means
that there is serious work to be done on the theory of symbolic racism and its assumptions.
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THEORY
There is no doubt that symbolic racism is the preeminent force guiding most Americans‘
opinions on racial issues. It is not clear, however, that its effect is the same in all places or
among all groups. The review of comparative conceptions of race provides evidence that locales
with different racial histories and social contexts will use different ideologies to justify racist
attitudes. The United States itself contains various racial contexts and histories across its
relatively massive geographic area. Some research in the United States has looked into how
likely blacks, Asians, and Latinos are to register on the symbolic racism scale compared to
whites (Henry and Sears 2002). Differences among whites themselves have been less explored.
There is reason to believe that the substance of symbolic racism differs within the United States
from region to region and perhaps between males and females.
FIGURE 1Whites' Attitudes Regarding Sending Children to a School with Half or
Mostly Black Students

Percent Answering No

50
40
30
20
10
0
Slave State Men Mostly Black

Slave State Men Half Black

Non-Slave State Women Mostly Black

Non-Slave State Women Half Black

Slave State Women Mostly Black

Slave State Women Half Black

Non-Slave State Men Mostly Black

Non-Slave State Men Half Black

Data: General Social Survey from 1994-1996.
Consider Figures 1 and 2, which show differences in opinions across regions and gender
as expressed in response to survey questions reflecting traditional racism and racial attitudes; the
responses also reflect the divisions within the United States. Some regions, particularly those
comprised of states that had slaves and anti-miscegenation laws (Appendix C), are likely to show
a stronger old-fashioned racism component to their symbolic racism while others are more likely
to reflect the conception of symbolic racism as a blend of racial affect with conservative
individualistic principles. An important aspect of measuring symbolic racism then must be
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determining how and for whom it functions (or does not function) as is generally conceptualized
and where any significant differences take place.

Mean Scale Scores

FIGURE 2Old Fashioned Racism, Conservatism, and Symbolic Racism Scales
0.8
0.7
0.6
0.5
0.4
0.3
0.2
0.1
0

Symbolic Racism
Conservative + Republican
Affiliation
Old Fashioned Racism

Data: General Social Survey 1994-2008.
Notes: The slave states and anti-miscegenation states fall within the South Atlantic, E. South
Central, and W. South Central regions.

Hypotheses
(A) Old-fashioned racism is still a fairly active political force, but the limited measures
and the conventional differentiation between racial stereotypes, racial affect, and old-fashioned
racism made by the symbolic racism literature reduces or confuses the appearance of oldfashioned racism, especially in states that historically had slaves or anti-miscegenation laws.
Including measures of support for interracial marriage that are not dichotomous will increase the
effects of old-fashioned racism. Figure 2 above has already shown some evidence of this. (B)
Old-fashioned and symbolic racism measures will load consistently on their own factors,
evidencing their separability, but when the symbolic racism scale is used rather than its
individual components, it will load across both conservatism and old-fashioned racism items.
(C) In slave and anti-miscegenation states, however, the symbolic racism scale will load only on
measures of old-fashioned racism and (D) the conventional conceptualization of symbolic racism
will obtain more for men than for women. (E) It is true that old-fashioned racism is not as
powerful a force as symbolic racism in the origins of whites‘ responses regarding affirmative
action and federal aid to blacks, but in slave and anti-miscegenation states, symbolic racism is
more closely related to old-fashioned racism and will also show more of an independent effect.
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(F) Finally, slave states and states with anti-miscegenation laws will have higher rates of
symbolic racism and old-fashioned racism as well as lower rates of interracial marriages.
A further addition to the hypothesis could be extended as follows: It is likely that the
undesirability of being labeled ―racist‖ suppresses old-fashioned racist-type responses.
Unfortunately, this cannot be tested directly with these methods, although the results will offer
some implications for the design of future research on symbolic and old-fashioned racism.
Suggestions for future research on racism—including the use of focus groups, in-person
interviews, and experiments using racial ‗codes‘ to signal complicity with and receptivity to
racist responses are offered. In the next section, the measurement and testing of these
hypotheses will be described.
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MEASUREMENT AND TESTING
In order to measure levels of old-fashioned racism, symbolic racism, and racial attitudes
among whites, I will use pooled General Social Survey (GSS) data from 1994-2008. This data
set is preferable to others that are available because the GSS has employed the same questions
about interracial marriage for all of the years from 1994-2008, with the exception of 1994; in that
year, the survey only includes one (rather than two) interracial marriage questions, and questions
regarding interracial marriage and racism permit a range of responses rather than the
dichotomous ―Yes‖ or ―No‖ response often used to measure old-fashioned racism.
The time range has been chosen because it represents a period during which there were
few major racially divisive issues, compared to the late 1960s and early 1990s. Controls for any
effects caused by small trends in the data set over time are alleviated by creating dummy
variables for the years 1996-2006, making 2008 the reference. The years 1994 through 2008 are
also a period during which traditional racism is not considered to have much effect. Besides
these theoretical advantages, there are practical advantages. Using all of these years offers a
much larger number of observations than other, similar studies have employed. Also, unlike the
often-employed National Election Studies, the GSS asks about interracial marriage in two
different ways (see Appendix B).
In order to measure old-fashioned racism, six variables, all recoded and standardized as
0-1 so that 1 equals more racism, will be used to create an old-fashioned racism scale. These
include questions about the laziness and intelligence of blacks minus their corresponding
answers for whites; laws against interracial marriage; disapproval of a close relative marrying a
black person; the relative closeness felt to blacks minus corresponding answers for whites; and
whether or not differences between the races are in-born.
Measures of symbolic racism follow Henry and Sears (2002) ―Symbolic Racism 2000‖
scale, and I have attempted to follow their advice concerning scale construction. This includes
covering all of the four themes of symbolic racism as well as using both Likert- and non-Likerttype questions offering different ranges of response. This standard has also been implemented
on the old-fashioned racism items selected for that scale. All of the questions from the original
Symbolic Racism 2000 scale and both scales created here, as well as their original response
options, are available in Appendices A and B.
Another scale was created indicating an increasing level of conservative ideology. It is
composed of a combination of ideological self placement on the traditional seven-point scale and
Republic party identification (leaning and strong Republicans). An additional scale was created
for religiosity, composed of a combination of strength of religious affiliation and rate of church
attendance. The reliabilities of these scales are displayed in Table 1. The Cronbach‘s α for the
scales are not as strong as those reported by Henry and Sears (2002). Here they are hovering
around the level called ―questionable‖ by the rules of thumb for reliability offered George and
Mallory (2003). However, when exploratory factor analysis is performed, the variables load
strongly on each individual scale, providing an added level of confidence in the scales‘
reliability.
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TABLE 1- Scale Reliabilities
Scale
Old-fashioned
Racism
Old-fashioned Racism
(No Favor Relative
Marrying Black
Question)

Cronbach's α
0.58

0.50

Old-fashioned Racism
(No Intermarriage
Questions)
Symbolic Racism

0.45
0.54

Symbolic Racism (No
Blacks Should Not
Push Question)
Conservative ID

0.46
0.59

Religiosity
Data: GSS 1994-2008

0.71

Next, factor analysis is performed on the different variables, confirming that they reflect
an underlying effect. Separate analyses are performed for the slave states and non-slave states,
as well as well as for gender. Then, a factor analysis on regions and gender is performed using
the symbolic racism scale and the individual old-fashioned racism and conservatism items in
order to measure the extent to which symbolic racism is a blend of old-fashioned racism and
conservatism in different contexts.
Separate regression analyses are performed for different regions and gender on various
white racial attitudes, including those concerning affirmative action, government aid to blacks,
desired level money spent on assistance to blacks compared to the status quo, and federal
involvement in improving the conditions of blacks
Finally, actual interracial marriage rates by region will be discussed in reference to levels
of support for interracial marriage, symbolic racism, and traditional racism in each region by
using Census data. The possible relationship of these factors to the levels of white support for
Obama in different regions in terms of votes in the 2008 election will be also be discussed and
compared to the different levels of symbolic and traditional racism in those areas using the levels
of white vote by state reported by the New York Times.
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RESULTS
Factor Analyses
As hypothesized, old-fashioned racism does appear to be distinct from symbolic racism,
but that distinction breaks down in slave states, where the two are much more highly correlated
and the dominance of symbolic racism is less clear. Tables 2 through 4 present the breakdowns
of the factor analyses. The distribution of the factor loadings on the aggregate sample is what
TABLE 2- Factor Loadings for Full Sample, Non-Slave States, and Slave States
Full Sample
Non-Slave States Slave States
1
2
3
1
2
3
1
2
3
Old-fashioned Racism:
Intelligence Blacks-Intelligence Whites
0.68
0.59
0.81
Laziness Blacks-Laziness Whites
0.61
0.60
0.60
Racial Differences Inborn
0.65
0.65
0.56
Favor Law Against Intermarriage
0.41 0.36
0.54
0.64
Favor Close Relative Marrying Black
0.41 0.41
0.52
0.54
Closeness to Blacks-Closeness to Whites
0.56
0.52
0.57
Symbolic Racism:
Affirmative Action Hurts Whites
Racial Differences Not Due to
Discrimination
Blacks Should Work Way Up Without
Favors
Blacks Should Not Push Where Not
Wanted

0.35

0.63

0.67

0.59

0.69

0.69

0.70

0.62

0.61

0.61

0.33

0.69

0.51

Conservatism:
Republican Party Identification
Conservative Ideological Self-Placement
Interfactor Correlations

0.50

0.84

0.84

0.84

0.77

0.80

0.73

1
1
1
1
1
1
2 0.31
1
1
1
2 0.25
2 0.38
3 0.03 0.18
1 3 0.07 0.24
1 3 0.13 0.03
Data: General Social Survey 1994-2008
Notes: Principal component factoring using oblique rotation. Only factors over 0.3 are shown;
factors loading above 0.5 are in bold.
would be expected from the previous work on symbolic racism. The measures comprising
symbolic racism and old-fashioned racism are distinct, and symbolic racism correlates with both
old-fashioned racism and conservatism. But this only tells part of the story. When the factor
analysis is conducted separately on slave and non-slave states, a slightly different pattern occurs.
Two of the old-fashioned racism measures load on the symbolic racism scale in the slave states.
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The symbolic and traditional racism factors are also much more strongly correlated. The
correlation coefficient for conservatism and symbolic racism in the slave states is almost half of
what it is in the non-slave states. The ―blacks should not push‖ question, representing the
―excessive demands‖ theme of symbolic racism, appears be more closely related to the oldfashioned racist laden content of symbolic racism in slave states, whereas it is associated with
both old-fashioned and symbolic racism in other states.
TABLE 3- Factor Loadings for Men and Women

1
Old-fashioned Racism:
Intelligence Blacks-Intelligence Whites
Laziness Blacks-Laziness Whites
Racial Differences Inborn
Favor Law Against Intermarriage
Favor Close Relative Marrying Black
Closeness to Blacks-Closeness to Whites
Symbolic Racism:
Affirmative Action Hurts Whites
Racial Differences Not Due to
Discrimination
Blacks Should Work Way Up Without
Favors
Blacks Should Not Push Where Not
Wanted

Women
2
3

Men
1

0.68
0.55
0.56

0.74
0.65
0.63
0.61
0.47
0.48

0.50
0.61
0.62

2

0.59

0.67

0.56

0.69

0.57

0.65
0.41

0.68

Conservative Values:
Republican Party Identification
Conservative Ideological Self-Placement
Interfactor Correlation

0.42

0.86
0.72
1
1
1
2 0.27
3 0.18 0.08

1

3

0.81
0.82
1
2
3

1
0.30
1
0.09 0.22

1

Data: GSS 1994-2008
Notes: Principal component factoring using oblique rotation. Only factors over 0.3 are shown,
factors loading above 0.5 are in bold.
Table 3 shows that there are also some differences between men and women.
Particularly, males are a much better approximation of what symbolic racism would be expected
to look like. Women, on the other hand, have some old-fashioned racism measures loading
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TABLE 4- Factor Loadings for Men and Women by Region
Men in
Slave
States
1
2
Old-fashioned Racism:
Intelligence Blacks-Intelligence Whites
Laziness Blacks-Laziness Whites
Racial Differences Inborn
Favor Law Against Intermarriage
Favor Close Relative Marrying Black
Closeness to Blacks-Closeness to Whites
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Symbolic Racism:
Affirmative Action Hurts Whites
Racial Differences Not Due to
Discrimination
Blacks Should Work Way Up Without
Favors
Blacks Should Not Push Where Not
Wanted

3

Men in NonSlave States
1
2

3

Women in
Slave States
1
2

3

1

0.84

0.72

0.76

0.48

0.60

0.61

0.57

0.62

0.44

0.64

0.61

0.62

0.56

0.61

0.55

0.52

0.61

0.39

0.37

0.41

0.69

-0.32

0.50

0.40

0.68

0.63

0.72

0.69

0.65

0.69

0.65

0.56

0.39

0.33

0.72

0.63

0.50

0.30

0.57
0.51

3

0.67

0.50

0.65

Women
in NonSlave
States
2

-0.38

0.82

Conservative Values:
Republican Party Identification
0.81
0.81
0.86
0.75
Conservative Ideological Self-Placement
0.75
0.82
0.70
0.79
Interfactor Correlation
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
2 0.43
1
0.23
1
1
1
2
2 0.31
2 0.16
3 -0.03 0.09
1
0.07
0.21
1
-0.01
1
0.16
3
3 0.18
3 0.14
Data: GSS 1994-2008
Notes: Principal component factoring using oblique rotation. Only factors over 0.3 are shown, factors loading above 0.5 are in bold.

1

alongside the symbolic measures. Women and men are fairly similar on aggregate, but women
and men from different regions are actually somewhat different. Consider Table 4, which shows
that there is some substantial variation across men and women in slave and non slave states.
Men in both regions show more conformity to the traditional conception of symbolic racism, but
men in slave states show nearly twice the correlation (r=0.43) between old fashioned and
symbolic racism compared to other men (r=0.23). Women present a much more confusing
picture, with several variables loading fairly strongly on the ‗wrong‘ factors. This indicates that
there is not as strong of evidence that symbolic racism is being measured by these items in
women, if it operates the same way as men at all.
Next, factor analysis is performed with the symbolic racism scale and the measures of
old-fashioned racism and conservatism. According to the traditional conception of symbolic
racism, the symbolic racism scale should load fairly evenly across both the old-fashioned racism
and conservatism measures. Table 3 presents the findings.
TABLE 5- Symbolic Racism Scale Factor Loadings by Region
Full
Sample Slave States
1
2
1
2
Old-fashioned Racism:
Intelligence Blacks-Intelligence
Whites
Laziness Blacks-Laziness Whites
Racial Differences Inborn
Favor Law Against Intermarriage
Favor Close Relative Marrying
Black
Closeness to Blacks-Closeness to
Whites
Symbolic Racism Scale:

Non-Slave
State
Women
1
2

Non-Slave
States
1
2

0.59

0.59

0.59

0.45

0.69

0.70

0.67

0.68

0.59

0.58

0.60

0.62

0.62

0.66

0.58

0.59

0.62

0.64

0.61

0.64

0.51

0.51

0.52

0.58

0.56

0.48

0.51

Conservative Values:
Republican Party Identification
Conservative Ideological SelfPlacement
Interfactor Correlation
1

1

2

0.13

0.37

0.40

0.53

0.38

0.83

0.84

0.82

0.80

0.77

0.76

0.78

0.80

1

1

1

2

0.15

1

1

1

2

0.11

1

1

1

2

0.07

Data: GSS 1994-2008
Notes: Principal component factoring using oblique rotation. Only factors over 0.3 are shown;
factors loading above 0.5 are in bold.
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Again, we see symbolic racism loading on different factors in the different regions. The
full sample portrays symbolic racism as being explained nearly equally by conservatism and oldfashioned racism, but symbolic racism is more composed of old-fashioned racism in both men
from slave states and women from non-slave states. Also, the correlation between the two
factors is somewhat smaller in non-slave state women. It is not at all surprising that respondents
in slave states express symbolic racism more as a function of old-fashioned racist attitudes than
conservatism, as it fits with hypothesis (C), but the findings are surprising for non-slave state
women, as women are generally assumed to be less racist than men. Although women do have
lower overall scores on the symbolic racism and old-fashioned racism scales, when non-slave
state women express symbolic racism it is defined more by old-fashioned racism than it is among
their male non-slave state counterparts.
TABLE 6- Whites’ Attitudes on Affirmative Action by Region

Full Sample
Independent
Variables
Symbolic Racism
Old-fashioned Racism
Conservative + PID
Highest Degree
Religiosity
Age
Slave State Dummy
dummy94
dummy96
dummy98
dummy00
dummy02
dummy04
dummy06
_cons
Adjusted R2

r
0.31
-0.01
0.15
0.01
0.00
-0.01
0.00
0.06
0.01
0.03
0.00
0.02
0.01
0.01
0.52***

Slave States

β
0.31***
0.00
0.13***
0.01
0.00
-0.01
0.00
0.04***
0.01
0.04**
-0.01
0.02
0.01
0.02
0.13

Non-Slave States

r
0.30
-0.02
0.13
0.05
0.00
0.01

β
0.30***
-0.01
0.12***
0.05**
0.00
0.01

r
0.32
0.01
0.15
-0.01
0.00
-0.02

β
0.32***
0.00
0.13***
-0.01
0.00
-0.02

0.06
0.02
0.04
0.02
0.06
0.03
0.03
0.51***

0.05*
0.02
0.06*
0.03
0.06**
0.03
0.05

0.05
0.00
0.02
-0.02
0.00
-0.01
0.00
0.54***

0.04**
0.01
0.03
-0.02
0.00
-0.01
0.00

0.12

0.14

N=6888
N=2366
N=4527
Notes: For the P weights, *p < 0.05, **p< 0.01, ***p<0.001. Items are keyed such that
higher scores reflect more racial animosity, conservatism, religiosity, and age. Highest
Degree is scored such that higher scores reflect lower levels of educational attainment.

Symbolic and Old-fashioned Racism and Whites’ Attitudes
Tables 6 through 8 test the hypothesis (D) that the symbolic and old-fashioned racism
scales exert different influences on different regions and genders. The first dependent variable
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analyzed is the whites‘ attitudes on racism item. Here symbolic racism is clearly the dominant
factor, but it should be remembered that in the previous factor analyses, symbolic racism mostly
reflected old-fashioned racism. Conservatism also exerts an influence, though its beta coefficient
(β=0.13) is less than half of symbolic racism‘s (β=0.31). Only in the South does the education
variable exert a significant effect. Age, religiosity, and old-fashioned racism all fail to show
statistical significance at conventional levels. Table 7 shows the effects of the scales on whites‘
attitudes about government spending to ―improve conditions‖ of blacks. Here, old-fashioned
racism becomes significant. Although its beta coefficient (β=0.11 in the full sample) is not as
large as symbolic racism (β=0.29 in the full sample), this should not be interpreted as oldfashioned racism exerting a radically smaller effect than symbolic racism. Considering that
symbolic racism, especially in the slave states, reflects higher levels of old-fashioned racism as
well, the effect exerted by old-fashioned racism independently is much more impressive. As the
factor analysis suggested, conservatism also exerts less of an effect on this particular racial
attitude in slave states than in non-slave states. The conservatism scale‘s beta coefficient
(β=0.11) in slave states is just more than half of the non-slave states‘ beta (β=0.20). Also,
compared to opposition to affirmative action, betas of symbolic racism across the items are
similar, but old-fashioned racism and conservatism show different effects.
TABLE 7- Whites’ Attitudes on Improving Conditions of Blacks by Region

Full Sample
Independent
Variables
Symbolic Racism
Old-fashioned Racism
Conservative + PID
Highest Degree
Religiosity
Age
Slavestate Dummy
dummy94
dummy96
dummy98
dummy00
dummy02
dummy04
dummy06
_cons
Adjusted R2

r
0.35
0.26
0.24
0.02
0.01
-0.02
0.02
0.09
0.07
0.02
0.03
0.05
0.03
0.02
-0.05

Slave States

β
0.29***
.11***
.17***
0.01
0.02
-0.02
0.01
0.06**
.06**
0.02
0.04
0.04
0.03
0.03
0.17

Non-Slave States

r
0.41
0.30
0.16
-0.01
0.02
-0.03

β
0.31***
0.13***
0.11***
-0.01
0.02
-0.02

r
0.32
0.23
0.28
0.03
-0.04
0.04

β
0.28***
0.09***
0.20***
0.03
-0.04
0.03

0.07
0.08
0.01
0.07
0.09
-0.01
0.01
-0.04

0.04
0.07
0.01
0.07
0.08*
-0.01
0.01

0.10
0.07
0.03
0.02
0.02
0.06
0.03
-0.04

0.06**
0.06*
0.04
0.02
0.02
0.05*
0.03

0.17

0.17

N=3367
N=1140
N=2227
Notes: For the P weights, *p < 0.05, **p<0.01, ***p<0.001. Items are keyed such that higher
scores reflect more racial animosity, conservatism, religiosity, and age. Highest Degree is
scored such that higher scores reflect lower levels of educational attainment.
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Table 8 shows the largest effect of old-fashioned racism exhibited. It is not only
significant in the slave states but in the non-slave states as well. Once again, symbolic racism
exerts the same magnitude of its effects across items, but old-fashioned racism has changed in its
effects. Old-fashioned racism has gone from being relatively small in proportion to the symbolic
racism scale on the affirmative action question, to a more moderate proportion on the ―improve
conditions‖ question, and on the assistance question it is more than half the coefficient of
symbolic racism in slave states. In Table 8, the beta coefficient for slave states increases to
β=0.18 and is highly significant, while the symbolic racism remains the same at β=0.31.
TABLE 8- Whites’ Attitudes on Spending to “Assist” Blacks

Full Sample
Independent
Variables
Symbolic Racism
Old-fashioned Racism
Conservative + PID
Highest Degree
Religiosity
Age
Slave State Dummy
dummy94
dummy96
dummy98
dummy00
dummy02
dummy04
dummy06
_cons

r
0.38
0.35
0.21
0.00
0.04
-0.02
0.02
0.10
0.02
0.03
0.00
0.06
-0.02
0.01
0.01

Slave States

β
0.31***
0.14***
0.14***
0.00
0.05**
-0.02
0.01
0.06***
0.01
0.03
0.00
0.05*
-0.02
0.01

Non-Slave States

r
0.40
0.42
0.22
0.03
-0.01
0.00

β
0.31***
0.18***
0.15***
0.03
-0.01
0.00

r
0.36
0.30
0.21
-0.02
-0.02
0.04

β
0.30***
0.12***
0.14***
-0.02
-0.02
0.02

0.10
-0.07
-0.03
-0.04
0.04
-0.14
-0.01
0.03

0.06*
-0.05
-0.04
-0.05
0.03
-0.11***
-0.01

0.11
0.07
0.07
0.04
0.08
0.05
0.03
0.01

0.07**
0.06*
0.08**
0.04
0.07**
0.04
0.03

Adjusted R2

0.19
0.21
0.17
N=3259
N=1179
N=2080
Notes: For the P weights, *p < 0.05, **p< 0.01, ***p<0.001. Items are keyed such that
higher scores reflect more racial animosity, conservatism, religiosity, and age. Highest
Degree is scored such that higher scores reflect lower levels of educational attainment.

The 2008 Presidential Election, Racism, and Miscegenation
In 2008 the United States elected its first black president, an event viewed by some as
major progress in the country‘s race politics. However, in the slave states grouped together and
analyzed here, the election seems to have elicited some reactionary racial responses. For
example, 92% of whites in slave states indicated on the 2008 sample of the GSS survey that they
would vote for a black president. Yet the actual rate of the white vote for the Democrat Obama
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in the slave states was 34%, an 11% decrease from the rate of the white vote for the Democrat
John Kerry in the 2004 election (see figure 3). Even this statistic downplays the effect of race in
FIGURE 3- White Votes for Obama and Kerry across Regions

Percent of Votes

60

National Obama

50

National Kerry

40

Non Slave States Kerry
30
Slave States Kerry
20
Non-Slave States
Obama

10

Slave States Obama
0
Data: New York Times‘ ―Electoral Explorer‖
http://elections.nytimes.com/2008/results/president/explorer.html (3/31/10)
the South, because the measure for slave states includes some more moderate states like
Maryland and Delaware. In particular, the levels of white votes for Obama in the Deep South
were low. Considering the history of racism in these states, it is not surprising that they had the
lowest levels of whites voting for Obama. Additionally, the Deep South states (besides Georgia)
show a much greater relative difference between the 2008 Obama vote and the 2004 Kerry vote
than the other states. This data is presented in Table 9.
Miscegenation rates also tell an interesting tale. Interracial marriage rates in the slave
states, which all happen to be states which were forced to repeal their anti-miscegenation laws
after Loving v. Virginia declared laws barring interracial marriage unconstitutional (Fryer 2007).
The only exception to this rule is Maryland. Maryland only repealed its miscegenation laws on
its own in 1967, the same year the Loving case was decided. Further, where old-fashioned
racism exerts its greatest influence and intermarriage rates are the lowest—the Deep South—
votes for Obama were also the lowest among whites. The rate of intermarriage in the slave states
is shockingly low considering that there is nearly three times the proportion of the region‘s
population who are black, compared to the non-slave states. This is illustrated below in Table
10. Table 10 further demonstrates the theoretical support for including questions about interracial
marriage in any survey measure that attempts to make claims about white racism.
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TABLE 9- White Vote for Obama in the Deep South and the Slave States
2008-2004 2008-2004
Absolute
Relative
Local vs.
Local
Local
National
Kerry
Obama Difference Difference
Vote
Deep South
Arkansas
36
30
-6
-17%
Georgia
23
23
0
0%
Louisiana
24
14
-10
-42%
Mississippi
14
11
-3
-21%
Other Slave States
D.C.
80
86
6
8%
Delaware
45
53
8
18%
Florida
42
42
0
0%
Maryland
44
49
5
11%
North Carolina
27
35
8
30%
Oklahoma
29
29
0
0%
South Carolina
22
26
4
18%
Tennessee
34
34
0
0%
Texas
25
26
1
4%
Virginia
32
39
7
22%
West Virginia
42
41
-1
-2%
Data: New York Times‘ ―Electoral Explorer‖
http://elections.nytimes.com/2008/results/president/explorer.html (3/31/10)
TABLE 10- Interracial Marriage Rates and Black Population by Region
Non-Slave
Slave States
States
Intermarriage
Rates
3.1
6.6
Proportion of
Population Black
0.21
0.08
Data: 2000 Census (Fryer 2007)
Notes: Intermarriage rates are higher here than actual
black-white intermarriage rates because they reflect
intermarriage between any two minority groups.
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-12
-19
-28
-31
44
11
0
7
-7
-13
-16
-8
-16
-3
-1

CONCLUSIONS AND SUGGESTIONS FOR FUTURE RESEARCH
The symbolic racism scale is very useful for predicting whites‘ attitudes about racial
policy items, especially among the non-slave states and in particular the men in those states.
Despite its usefulness, the symbolic racism has several potential limitations that warrant careful
consideration. First, symbolic racism does not appear to have the same foundations in the slave
states that it does in the non-slave states. To the extent that symbolic racism is structuring
attitudes about racial policy in the South, there is reason to believe that it is functioning at least
in part a vessel to disguise old-fashioned racism. Second, its foundations also appear to be
different among women than men. The women‘s factor loadings, especially broken down by
state, are difficult to interpret under the theoretical framework provided by symbolic racism, but
it is possible that symbolic and old-fashioned racism activate different concerns in men and
women. This area warrants further and more rigorous investigation. Third, symbolic racism is
much more highly correlated with old-fashioned racism in the slave states than the non-slave
states and reflects less of the influence of conservatism. White men in the non-slave states are
perfect models of symbolic racism, with racism loading almost identically across measures of
conservatism and old-fashioned racism, while symbolic racism among men in slave states does
not have the same moderate-to-high levels of correlation that their non-slave state counterparts
exhibit.
The review of the comparative literature has shown that the ideological construction of
race is a product of a nation‘s historical, socio-cultural, and political history and thus varies
across nations. In Brazil the concept of ―racial democracy‖ has historically been employed to
halt discussions of programs that would promote racial equality (Marx 1998). Similar to racial
democracy in Brazil, the concept of ―égalité‖ in France has been used by some to prevent
discussions of inequality that centered on race. In the United States, the differing contextual
backdrops for race and differing ideological constructions of race have produced different
expressions of racism. This insight has been largely overlooked by the literature on symbolic
racism in the United States, where symbolic racism is supposed to explain nearly all of whites‘
opposition to racial policy items. In the non-slave states, a system of symbolic racism seems to
apply. But in the states with a history of slavery and anti-miscegenation laws, that history seems
to make itself felt through the expression of old-fashioned racism under the cover of symbolic
racism and its companion, individualistic conservatism. Individualism, like égalité and racial
democracy in France and Brazil, provides a socially acceptable cover for someone who feels
uneasy expressing more blatant, old-fashioned racist attitudes and beliefs. Unfortunately, the
extent to which this is true of the Southern brand of racism is likely impossible to prove when
relying upon survey data.
If surveys are inadequate for unpacking the origins of white Southerners‘ and possibly
white women‘s racism, what methodological options offer more hope? First, it is helpful to note
that surveys may not be completely useless for research on Southern white racism. A surprising
amount of people are willing to offer old-fashioned racist responses to some of the items,
especially questions that ask about interracial marriage without being dichotomized into ―Yes‖ or
―No‖ response options. When old-fashioned racism is measured this way, it begins to show
effects on Southern white‘s racial policy attitudes that are not apparent when looking at the full
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sample. Consistently including interracial marriage questions such as the MARBLK variable on
the GSS (see Appendix B) would be a major step towards improving the measurement of racism.
But even with these interracial marriage questions, the social desirability of not seeming racist is
likely to suppress the effects of old-fashioned racism among all whites.
One study has shown some inflationary effects related to the provision of privacy during
survey completion for more educated respondents, who would be more aware and thus more
sensitive of the social desirability of their answers to questions about racial attitudes (Krysan
1998); though the effects were only slight to moderate, more experimental research designs such
as this one are warranted. If interviewers could find a way of subtly indicating to respondents
that the expression of racist viewpoints was permitted in the interview setting, it might be
possible to get responses that could be freed from serious doubts about their reliability.
Allowing respondents privacy while they complete a survey may not increase the likelihood of a
racist response; after all, they are likely aware of the people to whom they are responding and
probably have some assumptions about whether or not the ‗academic types‘ implementing the
survey would consider a racist response socially desirable. However, indicating sympathy with
racist viewpoints through coded language or symbols, such as the confederate flag designs
popular throughout the South, might provide the permissive atmosphere required to allow racists
to let down their guard. It is hard to imagine that Don Lewis of the all-white basketball league
and the Louisiana justice of the peace who refused to marry interracial couples offered the same
justifications for their actions to their friends and confidants that they provided to national media
outlets.
Given the history of race relations and racism in the Unites States and especially in the
South, it takes a less heroic effort theoretically to assume that whites‘ responses on old-fashioned
racism are biased in the direction of social acceptability rather than honestly reported. It is
theoretically possible that many people may be unconsciously racist, but any political theory
positing that an unconscious force structures people‘s attitudes, opinions, and behavior is
difficult to accept without an overwhelmingly persuasive theory and impressive, robust empirical
evidence. Furthermore, to use the language of economics, the revealed preferences of whites,
particularly in terms of their patterns of self-segregation, mate selection, and voting behavior,
indicate that old-fashioned racism is still a pervasive force in approximately one third of the
country. Different methods than survey research could prove very useful to the literature on
symbolic and old-fashioned forms of racism; these methods could include focus groups, in-depth
interviews, and in-person surveys of whites by whites where an environment of racial antipathy
is strategically hinted at or cultivated to indicate a complicity in any old-fashioned racism the
respondent may harbor. It is certainly possible that these in-depth interviews would provide
resounding support for the theory of symbolic racism. However, the evidence presented here
suggests otherwise. What seems more likely is that, if whites could be coaxed into feeling that
the interviewer may sympathize with their old-fashioned racism, they will be more likely to
express it openly.
Sadly, racism is still a political entity in United States politics today; it operates in several
pernicious ways to undermine democratic values. In fact, there is some evidence that certain
democratic values, such as individualism, may be providing ideological shelter to racists who
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wish to keep their racist beliefs hidden from those who would judge their character. For
example, a person conducting an interview for a research organization (e.g., universities, polling
research firms, and other groups which, not without cause, must appear as essentially ‗academic‘
to the layperson) is unlikely to be perceived as amenable to the expression of racist beliefs by
most respondents. The effect could be that the respondent is more likely to keep the views they
know may offend others to themselves. Despite the breakdown of systematic formal racial
segregation, old-fashioned racism—the ideological basis for maintaining Jim Crow dominance—
is likely to have survived in some regions, despite the apparent failure of the system it was
constructed to maintain.
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APPENDIX A: THE SYMBOLIC RACISM 2000 SCALE
1. It's really a matter of some people not trying hard enough; if blacks would only try harder they
could be just as well off as whites. (1, strongly agree; 2, somewhat agree; 3, somewhat disagree;
4, strongly disagree)
2. Irish, Italian, Jewish, and many other minorities overcame prejudice and worked their way up.
Blacks should do the same. (1, strongly agree; 2, some-what agree; 3, somewhat disagree; 4,
strongly disagree)
3. Some say that black leaders have been trying to push too fast. Others feel that they haven't
pushed fast enough. What do you think? (1, trying to push too fast; 2, going too slowly; 3,
moving at about the right speed)
4. How much of the racial tension that exists in the United States today do you think blacks are
responsible for creating? (1, all of it; 2, most; 3, some; 4, not much at all)
5. How much discrimination against blacks do you feel there is in the United States today,
limiting their chances to get ahead? (1, a lot; 2, some; 3, just a little; 4, none at all)
6. Generations of slavery and discrimination have created conditions that make it difficult for
blacks to work their way out of the lower class. (1, strongly agree; 2, somewhat agree; 3,
somewhat disagree; 4, strongly disagree)
7. Over the past few years, blacks have gotten less than they deserve. (1, strongly agree; 2,
somewhat agree; 3, somewhat disagree; 4, strongly disagree)
8. Over the past few years, blacks have gotten more economically than they deserve. (1, strongly
agree; 2, somewhat agree; 3, somewhat disagree; 4, strongly disagree)
Source: Henry and Sears (2002)
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APPENDIX B: QUESTIONS USED FROM 1994-2008 GSS
TABLE 11- Questions on GSS
Symbolic Racism Questions on the GSS
Theme 1: Work ethic and responsibility for outcomes
Irish, Italians, Jewish and many other minorities overcame prejudice and worked their way
up. Blacks should do the same without special favors.
1- Agree Strongly 2- Agree Somewhat 3- Neither Agree nor Disagree 4-Disagree Somewhat
5-Disagree Strongly
(Reversed) (SR2K)
Theme 2: Excessive demands
(Negroes/Blacks/African-Americans) shouldn't push themselves where they're not wanted.
1- Agree Strongly 2- Agree Slightly 3-Disagree Slightly 4-Disagree Strongly
(Reversed)
Theme 3: Denial of continuing discrimination
On the average (Negroes/Blacks/African-Americans) have worse jobs, income, and housing
than white people. Do you think these differences are mainly due to discrimination?
1- Yes 2- No
Theme 4: Undeserved advantage
What do you think the chances are these days that a white person won't get a job or
promotion while an equally or less qualified black person gets one instead? Is this very likely,
somewhat likely, or not very likely to happen these days?
1- Very Likely 2- Somewhat Likely 3- Not Very Likely
(Reversed)
Note:(Reversed)= Recoded to indicate increasing levels of "symbolic racism."
(SR2K)= Exact question from Symbolic Racism 2000 scale.
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TABLE 12- Questions on GSS
Old-fashioned Racism Questions on the GSS
RACDIF2
PreQuestion Text:
On the average (Negroes/Blacks/African-Americans) have worse jobs, income, and housing
than white people.
Do you think these differences are . . .
Literal Question:
Because most (Negroes/Blacks/African-Americans) have less in-born ability to learn?
1- Yes 2- No
(Reversed)
INTLBLKS
PreQuestion Text:
D. Do people in these groups tend to be unintelligent or tend to be intelligent?
Literal Question:
Blacks?
1- Unintelligent 2 3 4 5 6 7- Intelligent
(Reversed)
WORKBLKS
PreQuestion Text:
The second set of characteristics asks if people in the group tend to be hard-working or if
they tend to be lazy.
Literal Question:
Blacks?
1- Hardworking 2 3 4 5 6 7-Lazy
MARBLK
PreQuestion Text:
What about having a close relative marry a black person? Would you be very in favor of it
happening, somewhat in favor, neither in favor nor opposed to it happening, somewhat
opposed, or very opposed to it happening?
Literal Question:
How about having a close relative or family member marry a black person?
1- Strongly Favor 2- Favor 3- Niether Favor nor Oppose 4- Oppose 5- Strongly Oppose
RACMAR
Literal Question:
Do you think there should be laws against marriages between (Negroes/Blacks/AfricanAmericans) and whites?
1- Yes 2- No
(Reversed)
CLOSEBLK
Literal Question:
In general, how close do you feel to Blacks?
1- Not Close at All 2 3 4 5- Neither One or the Other 6 7 8 9-Very Close
(Reversed)
Note: (Reverse)= Recoded to indicate increasing levels of "old-fashioned racism."
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APPENDIX C: VARIABLES BY YEAR

Variable

TABLE 13- Variables by Year
1994 1996 1998 2000 2002 2004 2006 2008

x
x

x
x

x
x

x
x

x
x

x
x

x
x

x
x
x
x
x
x

x
x
x
x
x
x

x
x
x
x
x
x

x

x

x

x
x

x
x
x
x
x
x

x
x
x
x

x
x
x
x

x
x
x
x

x

x

x

x

x

x

x

x

x

x

x

x

x

Intelligence blacks - Intelligence whites
Laziness blacks - Laziness whites
Racial differences due to inborn
disability
Oppose law against interracial marriage

x
x
x

Oppose close relative marrying black
Feel close to blacks - feel close to whites
Affirmative action hurts whites
Racial differences due to discrimination
Blacks should work their way up without
favors
Blacks should not push where they are
not wanted
Data: GSS
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APPENDIX D: ANTI-MISCEGENATION LAWS BY STATE
TABLE 14- States and Anti-Miscegenation Laws
Voluntary
Voluntary
Federally
Repeal after
Repeal before
Never Had
Imposed Repeal
1900
1990
Such Laws
Alabama
Arizona
Illinois
Alaska
Arkansas
California
Iowa
Connecticut
Delaware
Colorado
Maine
Hawaii
Florida
Idaho
Massachusetts
Kansas
Georgia
Indiana
Michigan
Minnesota
Kentucky
Maryland
Ohio
New Mexico
Louisiana
Montana
Pennsylvania
New Jersey
Mississippi
Nebraska
Rhode Island
New York
Missouri
Nevada
Vermont
North Carolina
North Dakota
Washington
Oklahoma
Oregon
Wisconsin
South Carolina
South Dakota
Texas
Utah
Tennessee
Wyoming
Virginia
West Virginia
Data: Fryer 2007
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